Life of Pi is one of those novels that is famous for
being rejected (at least five times, apparently) before finally being
published. It went on, of course, to win the Booker Prize. Contradictory though
it may sound, neither fact is surprising. Life of Pi is a
fairly extraordinary novel, extraordinary in both a good and a bad sense.
It
is in three parts and these parts, although they are wildly different, are
supposed to flow seamlessly, held together by the symbolism the author has
created. This is a self-avowedly spiritual novel. “I have a story that will
make you believe in God,” says a character, Mamaji, early in the novel. The
novel as a whole isn’t so didactic – not quite – but it is certainly strongly
suggesting to us that there is something unseen in the fabric of the universe.
Barack Obama, for one, has fallen for it. The novel is, he told its author, “an
elegant proof of God, and the power of storytelling”. It’s certainly the
latter, but it goes no distance towards proving the former. Obama does hit on
something, though: this conflation of storytelling and spirituality is a
significant element of the novel, as we shall see later.

Part one tells the life in India of young Piscine
Molitor Patel, Pi for short, the son of a zoo keeper and a quester, in the
manner of someone from a Hermann Hesse novel, after truth. He becomes a
Christian, a Muslim and a Hindu, all at once, much to the perplexity of his
modern, atheist family and the range of gurus to whom he goes for spiritual
succour. This is lightly and deftly told and, while the author clearly wants to
plant some seeds in our minds, he nonetheless avoids didacticism, mainly
because Pi himself is a pleasant, self-deprecating and hopelessly, unknowingly,
naive narrator. Thus, although we know we’re being set up for an examination of
spirituality we don’t, as we might in some of the less felicitous parts of
Hesse’s oeuvre (the Elder Brother episode in The
Glass Bead Game, for example), kick
against it.
Pi
goes on to study both zoology and theology, a pairing that might give coniption
fits to some of the creationists out there but Martel slowly guides us towards
the twin-track thematic impulses in the novel, nature and spirit, man and god,
man and animal, life and transcendence, reason and belief.
Part
one ends abruptly when the Patel family decide to emigrate to Canada. This
proves a disastrous decision: their ship is shipwrecked and only Pi survives.
Well, Pi, plus a giraffe with a broken leg, a hyena, an orangutan and a 450
pound Bengal tiger. All on the one lifeboat. Though not – nature being red in
tooth and claw and, after a few days at sea, extremely hungry – for very long.
The hyena quickly sees off the giraffe, then, with a little more difficulty,
the orang-utan, before falling in the third round to the majestic tiger. Only
beast and boy remain, adrift on the Pacific Ocean with no hope of rescue. What
next?
What
ensues is simply a masterclass in creative writing. Anyone serious about being
a writer must read part two of Life of Pi. It is superb. In
particular, study the way Martel manages the pace. The interludes become
increasingly dramatic, but they are interspersed with moments of reflection and
calm. Think about it. We have a story in which wild animals and a child are
adrift on a boat. What happens is inevitable. The animals kill and eat each
other. The boy will be next. And yet the reader is still enthralled. To be able
to spin that storyline out over more than two hundred pages is masterful. What
unfolds, of course, is wholly incredible, but such is Martel’s skill that we
are totally drawn into his fantasy. "I will turn miracle into routine. The
amazing will be seen every day," Pi tells us, neatly turning himself, like
Joseph Knecht in The Glass Bead Game, into a mystic. We believe. We
believe it when Pi slowly, very carefully, begins to tame the tiger, Richard
Parker. We endure his endless searches for food from the ocean, share his
revulsion at raw fish, and turtle blood, and the process of killing itself. We
wince at his constipation. We exult in his trapping of precious rain. We feel
the heat of the sun, the chafe of fabric on waterlogged skin. Always, we keep a
wary eye on the menacing Richard Parker. We share Pi’s wonder at their
continued co-existence. With him, we endure every one of the 227 days he is
adrift in the Pacific. With him, we fall a little bit in love with Richard
Parker.
The magic-realist fabulism of part two could not
have worked without the earthy realism of part one. We can believe Pi’s
understanding of the tiger’s nature, and his gradual battle for control over
it, because in the first section we were treated to an expert analysis of
animal and human natures, of battles for dominance, of the interrelationship
between man and animal. We know that Pi, son of a zookeeper, would have
sufficient knowledge to survive. It makes sense. What could be utterly
unbelievable falls neatly within the compass of the fictive dream. It works.
It
begins not to work when Pi and Richard Parker land on a mysterious island,
peopled by tree-dwelling, continent-hopping meerkats, an island which exhibits
an increasingly sinister mien. It is, we discover, not an island at all but a
seething mass of carniverous algae. Hmm. The beautifully constructed fictional
universe begins to unravel, and it is not immediately evident why Martel has
done this. What is his purpose?
There
is a strong metafictional element to Life of Pi, of course, and
this is where Barack Obama’s analysis is spot on: because this novel is indeed
in part about storytelling. It is about realism and magic-realism. James Woods
sums it up neatly in his review:
Martel proves, by skilful example,
that realism is narrative’s great master, that it schools even its own truants.
He reminds us in fact that realism is already magical, an artifice-in-waiting.
Yes, indeed, I think that’s true, but where does
the magic island come into it? All realism is blown away, the carefully
constructed world is dismantled and replaced by something plastic and
fantastically dull (in the literal sense of the phrase). To what end? We’ll
come back to that question, but first we need to look a bit deeper at the
philosophical basis of the novel.
Where
the novel succeeds and fails is in the roles of the respective gurus who guide
the questing Pi in his home in India. Here, Martel is treading on familiar
territory. Think, for example of Joseph Knecht’s gurus in The Glass Bead
Game, the wise and liberal, highly cultured man amongst men, Father Jacobus
and the otherwordly mystic, the Elder Brother. Or, in Mann’s The
Magic Mountain, young Hans Castorp is torn between
the enlightened liberal Settembrini and the proto-fascist Naphta. As with art
and science, good and evil, (man and God), we are being told that these gurus
represent the polars of the spirit. They offer different approaches to
knowledge; they are opposites, but attached. Or, as we might say back home,
they are two cheeks of the same arse. And this is true of the gurus in Life
of Pi to such an extent that one dialectical pair of them even shares
the name of Kumar: one an atheist teacher who shocks and confronts the pious Pi
(no coincidence in the name and his nature, of course), and the other a devout
Muslim baker whose humility and humanity greatly impress the boy.
The
trouble, it seems to me, is that Pi is not sufficiently immersed in their
teaching to take on their wisdom (or otherwise). Thus, when we get to the crux
of the matter, the yearning which accompanies Pi’s isolation and his loneliness
and his growing understanding of the regal animal with which he shares the
boat, it does not feel fully realised. What happens instead, as James Woods
points out, is that God gradually disappears from Pi’s thoughts in the progress
of his passage at sea. Nonetheless, while I think Woods may be right to an
extent, I think he may be missing the main point. 227 days adrift on the
Pacific might indeed give one pause to ponder the nature of God and reality
but, as Florence
Stratton reminds us in her excellent review,
Pi was also greatly exercised by trying not to be eaten by a hungry Bengal
tiger. Brute reality must always intervene. This is the message of a Jacobus as
opposed to an ascetic Elder Brother or, in Life of Pi, of the
teacher Kumar as opposed to the baker Kumar. There is a place for God, and
belief in God, but so too is there a place for action. Pi, for all his pious
thoughts (and much to his horror if he were ever to realise it) is precisely an
exemplar of the rational approach of Settembrini and teacher Kumar and Father
Jacobus. Stratton’s conclusion is that Martel:
is not out to prove the existence of
God, but rather to justify a belief in God’s existence. Martel’s position is a
post-modernist one, from the perspective of which God’s existence has the same
status in relation to truth and reality as Pi’s experience of shipwreck.
She continues:
Life of Pi is organized around a
philosophical debate about the modern world’s privileging of reason over
imagination, science over religion, materialism over idealism, fact over
fiction or story.
I think she may be right. But rather than seeing
this as a positive, this is where I start to worry. This is where, from
Rousseau onwards into the present day (McCarthy, for example) writers begin to
create monsters out of human beings and ascribe to them the source of any
number of malaises. For these people, the Enlightenment is the nadir, the
moment when mankind lost its connection to mystery and faith and the holy
spirit, and instead began to worship itself as its own, immanent god. In this
way, humanity is set as a straw man against itself, with exaggerated claims for
the malignancy of man or the efficacy of faith. Binary oppositions are created
with which to “prove” that mankind has lost its way and is heading into a
godless abyss.
Martel,
to his credit, does not take us this far. His novel is much more buoyant than
this, with a far greater sense of hope, and decency, and a feeling that man may
not have travelled all the way into abjection, as our more eccentric
philosophers and writers (Eric Voegelin, say) may attest. Nonetheless, he does
join the brigade against reason. For all his rationality, Pi is allowed to say,
unchallenged:
“Reason is excellent for getting
food, clothing and shelter. Reason is the very best tool kit. Nothing beats
reason for keeping tigers away. But be excessively reasonable and you risk
throwing out the universe with the bathwater”
This is the sort of simplistic nonsense one is
accustomed to hearing from televangelists and Hoover
Shoats-like corner-street
con-preachers. As a philosophical basis on which to hook a novel it is trite.
Now perhaps, of course, it is said ironically, and the fact that Pi’s actions
do not correspond to his thoughts would certainly bear that out.
But
we return to the episode on the carnivorous island. What does it mean? I asked
the question earlier, without answering. That is because, as Stratton points
out, it cannot be answered except retrospectively, after the second telling of
the story of his shipwreck by Pi to the two Japanese investigators which is the
crucial element of part three of the novel. Indeed, it is a crucial element of
the whole novel. This is where Martel tries to pack his greatest punch, his
principal observation about the triumph of reason over faith.
This
part, in which two Japanese loss adjustors come to interview the survivor Pi,
when he finally reaches land in Mexico, in order to discover the fate of the
ship which sank, has echoes of the ending of McCarthy’s Cities of the
Plain, or the heretic passage in his The Crossing. In each, we
are given a metastory, a story behind the story, a radical retelling of what is
going on in the main narrative. And, again, the purpose is metaphysical. Here
is the mystery of man, McCarthy and Martel tell us, and here is the mystery of
God. Each is the same and each is different. Each speaks of truth and each is
false. Wonder, wonder about it all. Well, wonder indeed, but for me, I prefer
Erik Satie’s rejoinder to “Wonder about yourself”.
The Japanese investigators simply do not believe
Pi’s story – and who can blame them, of course, for it is truly unbelievable.
But Pi then tells them another story, this time of a shipwreck without animals
but with other human beings – Pi’s mother, an injured sailor and a French cook.
This short passage quickly becomes horrific, a story of murder and cannibalism
and the search for the meaning of evil. The story is, of course, the same as
the story with animals – for the cook read the hyena, for Pi’s mother the
orangutan, for the injured sailor the giraffe and so on. Which story do you
prefer? Pi asks the two Japanese men. The story with animals, they conclude,
and in so doing, in finally preferring what they had previously disbelieved,
they find some sense of faith and spirit and adventure and free themselves,
these rationalist men, from the curse of reason.
So
back to the island. What is it? It is, of course, symbolic. In Stratton’s
reading, which I find compelling, she suggests it is allegorically “taking
direct aim at consumer capitalism as the most secular and materialist form of
human existence.” There is no sense of the individual on the island, only a
collective will to consume. The island is a spiritual vacuum, a nothingness,
the blankness at the centre of our modernity. Stratton says:
The deconstructive project of Life
of Pi is to replace the Enlightenment belief in the power of reason to
liberate humanity with a belief in the transforming power of story.
But if this is so, Martel is establishing a false
binary. This is the sort of connection made by people like Karen Armstrong, who
correctly note the role of myth (which is, after all, the original
storytelling) in the creation of religions and religious thought. So far so
good, but next these critics try to suggest an opposition between this sense of
storytelling and the power of reason. No such opposition exists. The world of
reason can embrace, perfectly, the idea of storytelling. It can even accept it
as a means of exploring rational ideas: what are fables and folk tales, if not
rationalist examinations of the foibles of humanity? There is a place for
storytelling and there is a place for reason, but they can also coexist
perfectly harmoniously. Those who attempt to decry Enlightenment beliefs by
asserting they must, somehow, imprison humanity in some reductive, emotionless
shell, or carnivorous island, are ascribing to it something completely false
and alien. And this, for me, is the problem with Martel’s island and, by
extension, the message of his entire novel. To criticise reason for engendering
a lack of belief, and to promote belief as an antidote to reason is simplistic.
To blame the Enlightenment for the ills of the world is shallow. To shelter
behind the power of storytelling is naive. Man is not, nor does he want to be,
an immanent god, but he can still be a transformative power for good. I think
Pi Patel believes this. I’m not entirely convinced that Yann Martel does.
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